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ABSTRACT 
In various regions around the world, the United States suffers from a significant 
deficit in operational awareness.  In areas like the Middle East, reliable information 
regarding local attitudes and concerns towards U.S. policy are often unknown or 
overlooked.  U.S. actions and policies can sometimes unintentionally incite anger and 
resentment among segments of the world community.  Additionally, the DoD has scarce 
few individuals who understand the cultural complexities of a given region and know key 
persons within.  These shortfalls in operational awareness can provide an inadequate 
understanding of why tensions exist or how to address them properly.  As a result, the 
U.S. is at times surprised by unfavorable events when it should be prepared and have 
adequate forewarning.  To summarize, the U.S. has significant blindspots regarding 
operational awareness and an insufficient number of persons networked into these 
obscure regions. 
This thesis examines the potential of the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
increase operational awareness by fostering foreign relationships between DoD personnel 
and their foreign counterparts.  This thesis further analyzes the value of encouraging U.S. 
military officers and NCOs to establish, maintain, and further develop personal and 
professional relationships with foreign military and defense civilians throughout their 
careers.  Based upon an examination of the advantages foreign relationships can bring to 
secure U.S. policy objectives, courses of action and programs will be recommended to 
maximize the benefits from fostering foreign relationships within the DoD.      
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We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of 
our neighbors.1 
A. BACKGROUND: A DEFICIT OF OPERATIONAL AWARENESS   
While the United States may be considered the most powerful nation on Earth, it 
remains a nation dangerously unaware, naive, and sometimes ambivalent regarding the 
intentions of allies and adversaries throughout the world.  In multiple regions, there exists 
a significant deficit in both operational awareness and cultural intelligence, the effects of 
which are currently endangering the nation’s security interests and international 
standing.2  Frequently, the U.S. appears culturally disconnected from various populations 
and this unintentional detachment is often misinterpreted by some in the international 
community as an uncaring and disrespectful attitude.  Additionally, U.S. actions and 
policies regularly incite anger and resentment among certain segments of the world 
population.  Without an enhanced connection between the U.S. and the international 
community, operational awareness and cultural intelligence will continue to be deficient, 
creating significant vulnerabilities in key regions.  The continued development of the 
nation’s “enduring alliances” as mentioned in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review will 
be decisive in countering the current shortcomings in operational awareness and cultural 
intelligence.3  Consequently, the United States must strive to create an atmosphere that 
promotes improved understanding of foreign allies and adversaries alike.   
The Department of Defense (DoD) is positioned to play a critical role in 
developing an understanding of allies and adversaries since U.S. military forces are 
stationed around the globe and often operate in remote areas when working with foreign 
                                                 
1 Sun Tzu and Lionel Giles Xgiles, The Art of War (Wilder Publications, 2008). 
2 Insert definitions of Operational Awareness and Cultural Intelligence. 
3 Quadrennial Defense Review (February 6, 2006): 6. “Achieving the vision set out in this Report will 
only be possible by maintaining and adapting the United States’ enduring alliances.  Alliances are clearly 
one of the nation’s greatest sources of strength.” 
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counterparts.  Indeed, the DoD currently has significant portions of its personnel in direct 
contact with foreign nationals in a variety of settings to include academic schools, 
operational missions, and multinational exercises.4  Some DoD personnel already have 
relationships that can provide useful operational awareness and cultural intelligence, 
while many others are in a position to network and create additional contacts.  The 
interaction between DoD personnel and foreign counterparts creates valuable 
relationships that can in turn generate significant levels of operational awareness and 
cultural intelligence.  Leveraging DoD’s foreign relationships and encouraging the 
development of new contacts is essential to safeguarding the United States’ security 
interests worldwide.   
DoD personnel are an ideal population uniquely situated to provide awareness if 
properly utilized.  For example, military officers are encouraged throughout their careers 
to develop and maintain relationships with foreign counterparts while at DoD schools or 
during operational assignments and multinational exercises.  The stated purpose is 
usually to gain familiarity with a foreign culture, and more importantly, to cultivate 
friendships with foreign officers who might currently or some day have tremendous 
influence in their respective militaries.  Unfortunately, there is little encouragement 
outside of the aforementioned schools and exercise venues, and when these assignments 
are complete, the relationships effectively end.  No institutionalized mechanism exists 
within the DoD that effectively fosters the development and preservation of foreign 
relationships.  Furthermore, there is insufficient awareness of current or preexisting 
associations between DoD personnel and foreign counterparts to gauge whether or not 
beneficial relationships already exist.  A thorough commitment to enhancing existing 
relationships, while strongly emphasizing and encouraging new interactions, will result in 
substantial increases in operational awareness and cultural intelligence.   
                                                 
4 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are two prime examples, but 
DoD personnel interact with foreign counterparts throughout the world in a variety of smaller scale 
operations and exercises. 
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B. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to identify a means of increasing 
operational awareness overseas for the DoD.  With this in mind, the thesis examines the 
degree to which foreign relationships contribute to operational awareness and cultural 
intelligence.  This project puts forth the hypothesis that fostering the development and 
preservation of foreign relationships by U.S. military personnel will significantly benefit 
the DoD and support U.S. policy by increasing operational awareness throughout the 
world.  The project investigates shifting the institutional culture in the DoD concerning 
relationships between U.S. military personnel and foreign counterparts by developing a 
strategy that supports the establishment and maintenance of foreign contacts.  
Additionally, the thesis highlights the associated benefits of fostering foreign 
relationships.  Historical examples of individuals with key foreign relationships and 
networking skills are presented to demonstrate the intrinsic value foreign contacts bring 
to military operations and U.S. policy objectives.  Through developing an argument that 
favors fostering foreign relationships, this thesis seeks to provide a framework for 
expanding operational awareness and cultural intelligence within the DoD in support of 
U.S. policy objectives.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
Upon identifying deficits in operational awareness and cultural intelligence, 
fostering the creation and preservation of foreign relationships will set the conditions to 
counter and overcome the aforementioned shortfalls.  To support the assertion that 
foreign relationships are a viable means of generating operational awareness, a detailed 
analysis of the associated benefits pertaining to foreign relationships and their value to 
U.S. policy and military operations will be conducted.  Positive results of foreign 
relationships, such as the establishment of trust, influence, and social networking, will be 
included in the analysis.  Current challenges such as insufficient awareness of existing 
foreign contacts and relationships being underutilized or un-networked within the DoD 
will also be addressed.  Additionally, historical examples of military and political 
officials possessing noteworthy foreign contacts will be presented to reinforce the notion 
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that foreign relationships can breed trust, influence, cultural intelligence, and ultimately, 
operational awareness.  As a result of this research, recommendations will be presented to 
include a framework for establishing and maintaining foreign contacts throughout the 
careers of U.S. military personnel.  At the conclusion of this thesis a short hypothetical 
scenario will be introduced followed by a strategy for implementing the thesis 
recommendations.  The advantages of fostering foreign relationships will be thoroughly 
examined at this point and fundamental recommendations for institutionalizing programs 
that promote foreign relationships among DoD personnel will be presented.          
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEWS 
1. Chapter II: Why Foreign Relationships?  
Personal relationships with foreign counterparts are a vital mechanism for gaining 
trust and influence.  Without properly networked personnel, no amount of technology, 
advanced weapons systems, or troops will allow a lasting victory.  Networked personnel 
are individuals with the ability to remain socially connected with counterparts and 
maximize the relationship and influence.  DoD personnel must become better networked 
with international contemporaries in order to gain an improved understanding of regional 
and world conditions.  Chapter II provides discussion on why foreign relationships are a 
vital means for generating operational awareness and cultural intelligence.  The chapter 
includes an analysis of the benefits derived from maintaining foreign contacts and any 
perceived risks involved. 
2. Chapter III: Historical Vignettes 
Throughout history examples abound of individuals using personal relationships 
to benefit their country or organization. This chapter presents a series of examples that 
demonstrate the utility of cultivating foreign relationships and highlights the impact on 
advancing foreign policy and military objectives.  The vignettes depicted are not limited 
solely to U.S. examples and are meant to illustrate further the potential benefits of 
developing foreign contacts among U.S. military personnel.     
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3. Chapter IV: U.S. Application and Recommendations 
The benefits of foreign contacts and the historical examples presented clearly 
express the need for a system promoting foreign relationships among DoD personnel.  
The U.S. military must take advantage of the unique opportunities available to its forces 
and institutionalize the process of establishing and maintaining foreign relationships.  
Chapter IV discusses current U.S. applications relating to foreign relationships and makes 
recommendations to maximize benefits and improve DoD’s global and regional 
awareness.  Recommendations include such programs as the Foreign Contact Database 
(FCD), Funded Foreign Relationship Maintenance (FFRM), Multinational Missions and 
Exercises, and Reunions and Conferences.       
4. Chapter V: Conclusion  
Chapter V summarizes the thesis and proposes a strategy for institutionalizing 
programs that foster the creation and continued development of foreign relationships.  
Any limitations to the methodology and thesis are discussed in this chapter. 
 6
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II. WHY FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS? 
Knowing your enemy is not an historical U.S. strength.  Americans 
generally do not appreciate other societies and cultures, much less “know” 
them well enough to facilitate accurate predictive analysis.5 
A. WHY FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS? 
Foreign relationships provide a wealth of information and access.  America has 
the most technologically advanced military in the world and, “...the armed forces seems 
content to rely on its increasingly net-centric and technological-based systems of combat.  
As a result, the human element is often minimized; left as an afterthought to be utilized 
by ground forces on the fly…”6    Fostering foreign relationships helps to understand the 
“human element” of operations by using the knowledge and influence gained from 
foreign contacts to secure military and policy objectives.   
DoD personnel are uniquely positioned to exploit foreign relationships.  Few 
Americans have access to foreign officials and very seldom do they travel or live in 
foreign lands for extended periods of time.  Military personnel have routine contact with 
foreign counterparts during operational assignments, multinational exercises, and at a 
variety of DoD schools.  Because of the numerous opportunities to interact with foreign 
officials, it is beneficial to encourage DoD personnel to develop relationships with 
foreign counterparts throughout their careers. 
Knowledge of the population is critical for success in irregular warfare.  
Relationships with foreign officials helps provide additional intelligence, awareness, and 
potentially, influence.  Knowledge and influence are crucial to succeeding in irregular 
warfare campaigns.  The U.S. is at present dangerously unaware of significant cultural 
and operational conditions in several regions of the world.  A lack of personnel who are 
                                                 
5 A. W. Stewart, Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy: Cultural Difficulties with the World (Carlisle Papers 
in Security Strategies: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 4.  
6 J. Helfers, “Hearts and Minds in 2025: How Foreign and Domestic Culture Will Shape the Future 
Battlefield,” Beyond Shock and Awe: Warfare in the 21st Century, 2006, 130. 
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socially networked with foreign counterparts contributes to this shortfall and the assertion 
that, “America needs to maintain cultural relations in areas where its own intelligence 
resources are lacking,” is a point worth addressing.7  While foreign relationships are not a 
“silver bullet,” they offer several advantages that can significantly benefit military 
operations and the execution of foreign policy.              
B. BENEFITS OF FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS 
There are significant advantages to establishing and maintaining robust 
relationships among foreign counterparts.  Interaction with foreign contacts creates a 
sense of familiarity with the culture and provides insight into country and regional 
perspectives.  This familiarity creates a “culturally savvy” service member who is better 
prepared to service his country: 
Cross-cultural savvy implies that an officer can see perspectives outside 
his or her own boundaries.  It does not imply, however, that the officer 
abandons the Army or American culture in pursuit of a relativistic 
worldview.  Instead, the future strategic leader is grounded in national and 
Army values, but is also able to anticipate, understand, and empathize with 
the values, assumptions, and norms of other groups, organizations, and 
nations.8 
The insight gained from these relationships provides valuable cultural intelligence in 
addition to more accurate assessments of regional and global issues.  This improved 
understanding can potentially aid military leaders and policymakers in developing more 
effective plans and strategies while reducing the likelihood of alienating and angering 
foreign populations. 
Fostering foreign relationships also sends strong messages to allies.  By 
developing trusted relationships with foreign counterparts, the U.S. demonstrates mutual 
respect towards fellow military and defense officials from allied nations.  This respect 
helps break down cultural barriers and eliminate negative stereotypes.  Having 
                                                 
7 Helfers, “Hearts and Minds in 2025: How Foreign and Domestic Culture Will Shape the Future 
Battlefield,” 185. 
8 D. Snider, “The Future of the Army Profession,” Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession, 2005, 
615. 
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relationships with foreign officers and defense officials promotes trust and a more open 
exchange of ideas among counterparts.  Trust facilitates important missions such as 
coalition building and intelligence sharing.  Personal friendships further aid in the 
establishment of trust among counterparts: “Within relationships that have both personal 
and professional bases, trust can be built more easily and trouble can be resolved more 
easily.”9  Additionally, as relationships progress over time a bond can develop between 
counterparts that remain strong even when country relations falter:  
…sacrifices made in a relationship, are not seen as bygones.  It suggests 
that individuals are likely to be more committed to a relationship when 
they have more of a history together and they are likely to make more of 
an effort to maintain a good relationship when trouble occurs…10 
Counterparts who build and develop trust also gain a level of influence over one another, 
which can be extremely valuable in promoting U.S. interests.  A foreign counterpart is 
more likely to share information with a trusted American contact than a stranger or casual 
acquaintance.  Trust and influence among DoD personnel and foreign contacts can 
potentially provide more intelligence and access to regions where information has 
previously been insufficient or restricted.  The end results of fostering foreign 
relationships are significant increases in operational awareness.     
C. GENERATING OPERATIONAL AWARENESS 
Instituting a culture within the DoD that encourages the pursuit of foreign 
associations ultimately helps generate operational awareness.  Foreign relationships breed 
familiarity with counterparts and their culture.  Familiarity builds trust, which is 
instrumental in gaining both influence and operational awareness.  While high-tech 
weapon systems and overwhelming combat power are important military instruments, 
they can not win hearts and minds or exert as much influence as a few individuals 
properly networked with the right connections.  Operational awareness and cultural 
intelligence have become increasingly valuable when compared with conventional 
                                                 
9 F. Six, The Trouble with Trust (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 51.   
10 Ibid., 23. 
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capabilities as expressed by Major General Robert Scales (Ret.) when he stated that , 
“…intimate knowledge of the enemy’s motivation, intent, will, tactical methods, and 
cultural environment have proven to be far more important than smart bombs, aircraft, 
and expansive bandwidth.”11  Fostering foreign relationships within the DoD is a means 
that will generate additional operational awareness and cultural intelligence.  While there 
are inherent risks involved in encouraging contact with foreign contemporaries, there are 
also extreme benefits, which will be highlighted further in subsequent chapters.     
D. ASSOCIATED RISKS OF FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS 
Despite the benefits, there are risks associated with encouraging foreign 
relationships among DoD personnel.  First and foremost is the danger of disclosing 
classified information.  U.S. military officers have access to information and weapon 
systems data that are highly classified.  An argument can be made that having contact 
with foreign counterparts potentially puts the security of classified materials and projects 
in jeopardy.  While it is possible that a foreign contact might attempt to exploit a 
relationship to obtain sensitive information, DoD personnel following established 
security procedures can be expected to properly safeguard classified data.  Both 
American and foreign counterparts will undoubtedly use their relationships to gather 
valuable intelligence, but classified information can be protected and kept outside the 
relationship by remaining vigilant and adhering to security protocols.  Security clearances 
for DoD personnel should not have to suffer because an officer has numerous foreign 
contacts.  As long as personnel properly manage their relationships, sensitive information 
will be adequately protected.   
A second concern regarding foreign counterparts is that these relationships could 
adversely influence DoD personnel to favor the friendship over the obligation to their 
country.  While friendships with foreign contacts will create a certain amount of 
influence over the individual, the relationships should not be powerful enough to sway 
loyalty.  Contact with foreign counterparts will undoubtedly influence DoD personnel, 
but influence is a two way affair.  U.S. officers will also exert influence over their foreign 
                                                 
11 R. Scales, “Transformation,” Armed Forces Journal (2005): 24-5.   
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colleagues.  Concerns that some American personnel might possibly betray the U.S. if 
they develop relationships with foreign counterparts undermines their sworn oath of 
loyalty and commitment to duty.  While historically there have been cases of American 
military personnel conducting espionage, there is no conclusive evidence that suggests 
fostering the development of foreign relationships puts the DoD at further risk of 
betrayal.  Disloyal individuals are inspired to become traitors by additional factors than 
being influenced by a foreign counterpart and their example should only reinforce a sense 
of vigilance towards security procedures rather than discrediting the loyalty of personnel 
who currently serve.   
Another risk associated with foreign relationships is the concern that personnel 
could unintentionally create an international incident affecting country relations or 
national security.  This concern is unfounded as U.S. military personnel are in constant 
contact with foreign officials throughout the world.  Encouraging relationships with 
foreign counterparts should actually decrease the risk of international incidents as 
personnel will gain additional insight into a contact’s culture, which will in turn help 
prevent improper conduct.     
An additional concern regarding contact with foreign counterparts is that not all 
personnel are well suited or willing to have relationships with foreign officials.  The 
process of fostering foreign relationships should not be compulsory.  The DoD should 
encourage individuals who both desire and have a talent for developing foreign 
associations.  Personnel who lack the aptitude or willingness to bond with foreign 
counterparts will potentially create problems if they are forced to interact outside of their 
assigned duties.  Developing methods to screen personnel properly will assist in 
determining which individuals are aptly suited for foreign relationships and offset the 
risks of encouraging unsuitable candidates from developing contacts.     
Finally, foreign relationships should be viewed as long-term commitments rather 
than temporary or casual friendships.  In many cultures relationships are considered 
lifetime commitments, “Culture and human relationships are not amorphous blobs of 
customs and habits.  Relationships have and require structures, regular practices, and the 
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give-and-take of requests, demands, and commitments.”12  DoD personnel should be 
encouraged to continue relationships when assignments end and respect the friendships 
they have developed with foreign counterparts.  Maintaining foreign relationships can 
potentially yield benefits years after their establishment and should, therefore, be 
constantly nurtured at every opportunity. 
While there are several risks and concerns regarding the perceived dangers of 
foreign relationships, the potential benefits outweigh the negatives.  Monitoring DoD 
relationships and remaining aware of security concerns will mitigate the risks involved 
with participating in foreign relationships.  The DoD must have a certain level of trust 
and faith in its personnel to capitalize on the advantages of fostering foreign 
relationships.                   
                                                 
12 R. C. Solomon, and F. Flores, Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships, and Life (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2001), 48. 
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III. HISTORICAL VIGNETTES 
Personnel with foreign relationships bring immense value to the DoD and have 
been credited with facilitating U.S. policy objectives and providing critical support for 
military operations.  The previous chapter highlights several advantages gained from 
encouraging relationships with foreign counterparts; however, a certain level of 
vagueness remains in quantifying the value these relationships bring to the DoD.  
Examining historical cases of military officials who were able to exploit foreign 
relationships effectively is essential to achieving a higher understanding of the potential 
benefits presented from fostering these relationships.  While precise measures of 
effectiveness are difficult to establish, historical examples help provide evidence that 
significant advantages can be gained through having military personnel with foreign 
associations.  The following vignettes provide examples of officers achieving favorable 
outcomes as a result of having previously developed key relationships with foreign 
counterparts.  These individuals furthered their nations’ interests and standing through the 
skillful management of foreign relationships or by merely having key associations at the 
outset.  Regardless of the method employed to leverage relationships, these vignettes 
provide evidence that foreign associations can benefit military operations.        
A. T. E. LAWRENCE 
British military legend Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better 
known as T. E. Lawrence, is the quintessential example of the power of foreign 
relationships.  Lawrence was instrumental in the success of the Arab Revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire during his assignment in Arabia as a British liaison officer from 1916 to 
1918.  His extensive experience traveling throughout Arabia and numerous contacts in 
the region provided a wealth of operational awareness and cultural intelligence to British 
forces.  Lawrence’s previous dealings in Arabia, as a student conducting research on 
medieval crusader castles and later as a field archaeologist, provided an exceptional 
knowledge of the land and its people:       
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I had been many years going up and down the Semitic East before the war, 
learning the manners of the villagers and tribesman and citizens of Syria 
and Mesopotamia…In addition, I had seen something of the political 
forces working in the minds of the Middle East, and especially had noted 
everywhere sure signs of the decay of imperial Turkey.13 
Lawrence’s understanding of the region and its culture enabled him to easily interact with 
Arabs and earn their trust and respect. 
Lawrence’s position as an officer in the British Army, as well as his 
understanding of Arab culture, allowed him the opportunity to cultivate strong 
relationships with influential Arab leaders.  While assigned as an advisor to Prince Feisal 
bin Hussein, a key leader during the Arab Revolt, Lawrence established a rapport that 
ultimately benefited British interests in the region.  The ensuing friendship between 
Feisal and Lawrence provided a critical link between Britain and the Arab Army.  
Lawrence granted assurances of British support for the Arab cause while influencing 
Feisal and other Arab leaders to refrain from attacking the occupied city of Medina, 
keeping Turkish troops garrisoned in the city tied up in its defense.  He further convinced 
Feisal to change tactics and attack the Hejaz railway supplying Medina.  The routine 
ambushes and bombings along the railway by Feisal’s Arab Irregulars created a, 
“Maximum of loss and discomfort for the enemy,” and forced the Turks to devote 
additional troops to secure the rail line, resulting in British forces gaining significant 
maneuver advantages in the region. 14 
T. E. Lawrence exemplifies the tremendous benefits of establishing foreign 
relationships.  He proactively sought foreign contacts during his assignment in Arabia 
and used those relationships to further British political and military interests.  Many of 
Lawrence’s superiors and peers did not consider his affinity for Arab culture and its 
people productive or inspiring until he achieved tangible successes, such as the capture of 
                                                 
13 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph (New York: George Doran Publishing 
Company, 1926), 55. 
14 J. E. Mack, A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence (UK: Littlehampton Book 
Services (LBS), 1976), 150. 
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the strategic port city of Aqaba.15  Lawrence’s interest in Arabs and his respect for their 
culture were, however, appreciated amongst the Arab community in general.  As one 
Arab nationalist observed of Lawrence: 
It appears to me that this man is different from the rest of the Englishmen 
whom we have seen so far, that he listens attentively to the political 
organization of the Arabs and that his questions show a depth in the 
subject which is not present except with one who has in it a pleasure and a 
passion.16  
Lawrence’s ability to establish relationships with Arab leaders, in particular Prince 
Feisal, resulted in significant gains for British and Arab forces.  The example of T. E. 
Lawrence effectively demonstrates the influence foreign relationships can bring to 
military operations.   
B. MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD G. LANSDALE 
Major General Edward Lansdale is a compelling example of the importance 
personal relationships with foreign counterparts serve in furthering U.S. interests.  
Lansdale’s development of foreign contacts in the Philippines is particularly relevant in 
demonstrating the enormous benefit foreign relationships bring to U.S. foreign policy and 
military operations.  Throughout his service in the Philippines at the end of World War II 
and later during the Huk Insurgency, Lansdale met and befriended influential Filipino 
officers and government officials, one of whom later became president.  His keen interest 
in Filipino culture, particularly the music, allowed Lansdale a mechanism to effectively 
dialogue with Filipinos and understand, “…something they hold dear to their hearts.”17  
Lansdale used personal relationships and familiarity with Filipino culture to provide 
operational awareness and cultural intelligence that shaped U.S. policy and operations in 
the Philippines for over a decade. 
                                                 
15 Mack, A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence, 153. 
16 Ibid., 131-2. 
17 C. B. Currey, Edward Lansdale, The Unquiet American (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998), 26-7. 
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Lansdale understood the utility of foreign relationships and after World War II 
maintained relations with many of his contacts from the Philippines to include Major 
Mamerto Montemayor.  In 1950, while stationed in Virginia, Montemayor introduced 
Lansdale to Philippine Congressman Ramon Magsaysay who was visiting Washington on 
official business as the chairman of the Philippine Congress’ Defense Committee.18  
During their meeting both Lansdale and Magsaysay discovered they had similar positions 
regarding a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Huk rebels.19  Magsaysay was 
thoroughly impressed with Lansdale’s knowledge of the Philippine situation.  Upon his 
appointment to Secretary of National Defense later the same year, Magsaysay asked 
President Quirino to personally request Lansdale’s assignment as an advisor to the Joint 
U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) Philippines for the purposes of assisting the 
Philippine government in its counterinsurgency efforts against the Huk rebels.20 
While assigned to JUSMAG Philippines, Lansdale worked closely with 
Magsaysay advising the defense secretary directly on developing an effective anti-Huk 
strategy.  The two men eventually became roommates when security at Magsaysay’s 
residence outside Manila became unsafe due to increased guerilla activity.21  Lansdale’s 
direct access and growing influence with Magsaysay allowed the U.S. an unprecedented 
level of operational awareness as both men together developed a strategy for defeating 
the Huks.  Magsaysay willingly received Lansdale’s counsel, and with the support of 
JUSMAG and Washington, enacted programs that improved the professionalism of the 
Philippine military and ultimately gained decisive support from the population.  
Lansdale’s efforts during the anti-Huk campaign helped elevate Magsaysay’s reputation 
and in 1953, Ramon Magsaysay was elected president with more than double the number 
of votes cast for the incumbent Quirino.22 
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21 Ibid. 
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Major General Edward Lansdale remains a remarkable testament of the potential 
benefits foreign relationships present to U.S. policy and military objectives.  His 
connections to key Filipino military and political officials made him a pivotal figure in 
the successes of the anti-Huk campaign of the early 1950s: 
A prominent factor in the successful anti-guerilla campaign was the close, 
personal relationship that developed between Edward Lansdale and 
Ramon Magsaysay.  This relationship provided an effective conduit 
through which American advice affected Philippine actions during this 
period.  To overlook Lansdale’s role would be to neglect a significant 
chapter of this story.23 
Without Lansdale’s efforts to establish and maintain effective relationships, the Huk 
insurgency might have ravaged the country further and eventually toppled the young 
democracy.  The Philippines was not the only country where Lansdale effectively 
cultivated foreign relationships, but it remains his most significant and enduring example 
of how personal relationships can facilitate military objectives and influence foreign 
policy.   
C. GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI AND PERVEZ MUSHARRAF 
General Anthony Zinni’s relationship with President Pervez Musharraf of 
Pakistan is evidence that personal friendships with foreign counterparts are sometimes 
leveraged on multiple occasions to aid U.S. policy and military interests.  This vignette 
also demonstrates the utility of allowing military personnel to continue relationships even 
when country relations sour.  Zinni’s close friendship with Musharraf allowed the two to 
work through several bureaucratic obstacles at the national level, which quite possibly 
prevented a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India and additionally facilitated 
vital assistance in anti-terrorism activities before and after the attacks of 9/11.      
 
 
                                                 
23 Currey, Edward Lansdale, The Unquiet American, 95. 
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While assigned as CENTCOM Commander, General Zinni first met and 
befriended Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf during a visit to 
Pakistan.  After several days of meetings in April of 1999, both Generals had developed a 
strong rapport with one another:    
It was a great meeting, despite the chill cast by our [U.S.] sanctions. As I 
was leaving, we both agreed to stay in close touch (we exchanged our 
home telephone numbers). Our friendship would later prove to be 
enormously valuable to both our countries.24  
Indeed, one month later Pakistani forces initiated an incursion over the Line of Control 
with India into an area known as Kargil.  India reacted by counterattacking with its armed 
forces and after almost a month of fighting, both armies had conducted massive troop 
mobilizations along the Line of Control with fears of a possible nuclear exchange 
surfacing among the international community.  As a result, the Clinton administration 
dispatched Zinni to Pakistan in late June of 1999 to meet with Musharraf and Prime 
Minister Sharif.25  Because of his close association with Musharraf, Zinni obtained full 
support in convincing Sharif to order a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil in exchange for 
a meeting with President Clinton to end Pakistan’s isolation from the United States.26     
Later the same year after Musharraf came to power following a coup, he opted to 
first phone his trusted friend “Tony” Zinni to explain his reasons for ousting Sharif, 
before returning President Clinton’s call.27  During the conversation Musharraf insisted 
the coup was a last resort aimed at saving the country from a corrupt government and 
confided in Zinni, “I don’t care what most others think about my motivations or 
intentions; but it’s important to me that you know what they are.”28  As a result of 
Washington’s disapproval of the coup, Zinni was ordered to cease communication with 
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25 Ibid., 347. 
26 Ibid. 
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Musharraf.29  The directive lasted for only two months; whereupon, Zinni was asked to 
resume contact with Musharraf and request his assistance relating to attacks planned by 
terrorists residing in Pakistan against U.S. tourists throughout the Middle East.  
Musharraf responded by arresting the terrorists and allowing U.S. agents special access to 
the prisoners and their confiscated computer equipment.30  This unprecedented 
cooperation by Pakistani authorities would have been virtually inconceivable without 
Zinni’s close association with Musharraf.   
General Zinni’s personal relationship with Pervez Musharraf has furthered U.S. 
policy and interests.  Their involvement with one another prevented a possible nuclear 
exchange with India, led to the capture of key terrorists planning attacks against 
Americans, and currently continues to influence U.S. relations with Pakistan positively, a 
key ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  This example illustrates the benefits 
of encouraging relationships like Zinni’s and Musharraf’s when country to country 
relations fail.         
D. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOSEPH AGRA AND THE 2003 
PHILIPPINE COUP ATTEMPT 
U.S. Navy Commander Joseph Agra is an example of a military officer leveraging 
established relationships at the right time and place to rescue U.S. personnel and prevent 
unnecessary bloodshed.  During an assignment as the Pacific Command (PACOM) 
Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 2003, then Lieutenant 
Commander (LCDR) Agra utilized preexisting foreign relationships to diffuse a crisis 
situation and assist an allied nation.  While personnel with key relationships are not 
always positioned to prevent catastrophe, the following vignette demonstrates the results 
of having a well networked individual in position during a moment of crisis.           
On July 27, 2003, a group of dissenting mid-level officers known as the “Magdalo 
Group” and about 300 soldiers from the AFP captured the Oakwood Hotel located in 
                                                 
29 Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 348. 
30 Ibid., 349. 
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Makati, a business and financial suburb of Manila.31  The rebel soldiers sealed off the 
building, effectively taking hotel guests and staff hostage.  After placing charges of C-4 
explosives throughout the building, the coup leaders demanded that President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo relinquish power and order the release of former President Joseph 
Estrada.  Besides being a hotel, the Oakwood had permanent apartments that were home 
to numerous Western ex-patriots including two U.S. Embassy officials and the Australian 
Ambassador32.  Initial attempts by the Philippine government to negotiate a peaceful 
solution to the crisis were rejected by the Magdalo Group.     
LCDR Agra had been stationed in the Philippines since January of 2000 and 
during that time had befriended numerous junior, mid-level, and high ranking officers in 
the AFP.  Three days prior to the Oakwood Mutiny, LCDR Agra was notified by several 
junior ranking officers in the AFP that there would be a coup within 72 hours.33  Upon 
initiation of the coup, LCDR Agra quickly determined that several of the coup plotters 
were contacts from previous associations to include Captain Ben Gambala, the Baron, or 
Class Leader, of the Philippine Military Academy’s Class of 1995 whom LCDR Agra 
had trained in acquisition systems for the AFP.34  Since LCDR Agra still maintained 
relationships with several of the rogue officers, he traveled to the Oakwood Hotel, 
navigating through several AFP roadblocks using his military connections to high-
ranking officers to gain access to the AFP’s mobile command center.  Upon consultation 
with the U.S. Ambassador and the AFP’s ground commander, Major General Emmanuel 
Teodosio, LCDR Agra was granted access and escorted inside the Oakwood Hotel to 
negotiate the release of the American and Western hostages.35  After discussing the 
situation with Captain Gambala, LCDR Agra was given permission to evacuate the 
hostages using buses provided by the AFP.  The Magdalo Group later surrendered, but 
the AFP’s plan to resolve the crisis was to level the Oakwood Hotel using artillery and 
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recoilless rifle fire.  LCDR Agra overheard Major Generals Teodosio and Efren Abu 
discussing the battle plan, “Ayala-Sobel can build another hotel, but we cannot build 
another republic.”36  Fortunately, the Magdalo Group’s surrender prevented bloodshed, 
but LCDR Agra’s intervention helped set the conditions for a peaceful settlement.  
LCDR Agra’s relationship with several of the Magdalo Group officers and high 
ranking loyal AFP officers directly resulted in the peaceful resolution of a potentially 
deadly situation.  The incident generated goodwill towards the U.S. in addition to the 
appreciation of the Philippine and Australian governments.  Lieutenant Commander Agra 
will not always be able to use his foreign relationships to prevent violence, but this 
example shows that having networked personnel available during a crisis situation 
increases the opportunity for a favorable outcome.        
E. AFTERTHOUGHTS 
The vignettes present evidence of the power foreign relationships bring to military 
objectives and foreign policy.  Regardless of the apparent benefits presented by fostering 
these relationships, the concept of promoting foreign associations is not universally 
accepted within the DoD.  In some of the highlighted cases, the individuals profiled faced 
an institutional culture or bureaucracy that was not supportive of maintaining foreign 
relationships.  In other instances, sheer good fortune seemed a factor in having networked 
personnel in the right place at the right time.  This raises the question of how to place 
individuals with valuable relationships in areas where they can best support U.S. policy 
objectives.  The foremost challenge relating to fostering foreign relationships is the 
creation of programs that will allow the DoD to find and harvest valuable foreign 
relationships while allowing the positioning of personnel in assignments that maximize 
their contacts.  The following chapter will discuss programs that can assist in establishing 
and maintaining foreign contacts. 
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IV. U.S. APPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
…the United States must also work with new international partners in less 
familiar areas of the world.  This means the Department [of Defense] must 
be prepared to develop a new team of leaders and operators who are 
comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local 
and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and 
working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interests through 
personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence – rather than through 
military force alone.37 
The previous chapters demonstrate the significant advantages of having DoD 
personnel with established foreign relationships.  Individuals with key associations have 
historically leveraged foreign contacts for the benefit of the DoD and U.S. foreign policy 
interests.  Unfortunately, few entities within the DoD actually foster foreign relationships.  
Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are examples of 
communities that actively establish and maintain foreign relationships, but they comprise 
only a small percentage of DoD personnel.  While the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report recommends an expansion of both FAO and SOF programs, the two communities 
will continue to represent a narrow cross-section of the armed services.38  Additionally, 
personnel in these highly specialized branches tend to start establishing foreign contacts 
later in their careers once they begin FAO and SOF assignments.39   
The following is a summary of the challenges the DoD faces relating to 
establishing and maintaining foreign relationships among its personnel:  1) There is 
virtually no awareness regarding the extent of foreign contacts among DoD personnel.  
No system exists to track current and preexisting foreign associations or to determine if 
personnel have contacts that might benefit the DoD.  The DoD also can not accurately 
depict which personnel have relationships to a particular country, region, or a specific 
foreign leader , 2) DoD personnel are generally not afforded the opportunity to further 
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develop foreign relationships outside of current DoD schools, exercises, or assignments.  
Associations tend to deteriorate once assignments, courses, or joint exercises end.  3) The 
institutional culture of the DoD does not put a high premium on establishing and 
maintaining foreign relationships.  Military personnel are first and foremost expected to 
remain battle focused at the exclusion of all other distractions including maintaining 
foreign contacts.   
While the DoD faces significant challenges related to fostering and maintaining 
foreign relationships, there are five areas where the DoD can focus efforts towards 
creating an institutional culture that promotes foreign relationships.  Establishing a 
Foreign Contact Database, providing Funded Foreign Relationship Maintenance, 
increasing and encouraging multinational missions and exercises, expanding foreign 
education and cultural immersion opportunities, and promoting reunions and conferences 
are all areas where the DoD can focus and improve the capacity to promote and sustain 
foreign relationships.                       
A. FOREIGN CONTACT DATABASE (FCD) 
The Foreign Contact Database (FCD) has two primary objectives related to 
fostering foreign relationships.  The first objective is to provide awareness concerning 
foreign associations that currently exists within the DoD and the second is to create a 
permanent resource for cataloguing and maintaining contacts throughout the careers of 
DoD personnel and possibly beyond.  By meeting these two objectives, the FCD will 
provide the DoD the ability to track and maintain foreign contacts throughout the careers 
of its personnel.     
At present, the DoD has no formal mechanism for tracking foreign relationships 
among its personnel.  For instance, should the DoD need to know which personnel have 
associations with Chinese military personnel, the records would most likely only show 
those military attaches who have worked in China as FAOs.  A FCD would allow the 
DoD an in depth listing of personnel who have associations with Chinese military, either 
as attaches, UN Observers, or while attending any foreign military schools where both 
nations might send personnel.          
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The FCD is designed to allow each DoD military or civilian employee the ability 
to input foreign contacts into the database under their personal account, which would be 
linked to their pre-existing Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) account.  As an officer or 
soldier develops foreign relationships during his or her career, the contacts are added to 
their respective file in the FCD.  Additionally, the names of any foreign officers attending 
schools or courses with DoD personnel will be automatically inputted into the FCD of 
each DoD student attending the same course.  This capability provides awareness of the 
extent of foreign contacts among DoD personnel and further allows the ability to leverage 
relationships in the future should a contact become particularly influential or otherwise 
significant at a later date.   
Another benefit of the FCD is that it allows DoD personnel a permanent platform 
in which to store contact information on foreign counterparts.  FCD users would be able 
to utilize the database to store emails, phone numbers, and addresses for each contact 
stored in their personal account.  Additionally, the FCD would allow the user the option 
of synchronizing his or her personal foreign contact listings to a personal data assistant 
(PDA), external hard drive, or some other form of portable storage device.  Should a DoD 
employee lose a PDA or a computer hard drive crashes, information on a user’s 
respective foreign contacts will still be intact in the FCD.  As long as the user routinely 
updates contact information in the FCD, the user will retain an enhanced ability to 
maintain foreign relationships.  The FCD serves as an enduring means of maintaining the 
foreign contacts of DoD personnel. 
The Foreign Contact Database has dual roles: One of providing the DoD 
situational awareness regarding the amount and extent of foreign contacts among military 
and civilian personnel.  The database allows comprehensive knowledge of foreign 
relationships where there was previously scant information available.  The extensive 
information contained in the FCD, however, must be safeguarded in its entirety with 
access granted only to users and properly vetted security professionals maintaining and 
analyzing the database.  The second role of the FCD is to allow DoD personnel an 
augmented ability to maintain contact information on foreign counterparts.  Should a 
DoD employee somehow lose contact information on a foreign counterpart, the employee 
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will be able to access the FCD and reload the lost information.  The FCD serves as a 
valuable tool for the DoD as an organization desiring awareness of foreign relationships 
and to personnel striving to maintain contact with foreign counterparts.    
B. FUNDED FOREIGN RELATIONSHIP MAINTENANCE (FFRM) 
While the FCD helps catalogue and track foreign contacts among DoD personnel, 
other programs are necessary to help foster, encourage, and maintain foreign 
relationships.  One program designed to sustain foreign relationships is Funded Foreign 
Relationship Maintenance (FFRM).  U.S. military personnel encounter foreign 
counterparts throughout their careers and while some commands might actively 
encourage the establishment of foreign relationships, there are presently few official 
programs designed to expand and sustain these foreign associations.  FFRM is a program 
intended to allow DoD personnel the opportunity to broaden existing relationships. 
FFRM authorizes personnel with foreign contacts periodic funded travel to visit 
counterparts for the purposes of building rapport and developing the relationship.  These 
Foreign Travel Visits (FTVs) should be authorized under FFRM for personnel with 
legitimate contacts every three years for two-week increments.  The visits will permit 
DoD personnel the opportunity to strengthen foreign relationships and thereby gain 
additional knowledge and influence.  FTVs will be categorized as temporary duty (TDY) 
for qualifying service members to include funding for travel, per diem, and no charged 
leave days.  Consideration should also be given in certain cases to funding foreign 
counterpart visits to the U.S. when visits to the country in question may not be feasible.   
When considering which personnel qualify for FTVs, the question arises 
concerning what should be considered a legitimate foreign contact.  FFRM should have a 
process of vetting which contacts merit FTVs and also which personnel are capable or 
deserving of maintaining foreign relationships.  Some foreign contacts might be deemed 
harmful or incompatible with U.S. interests while some DoD personnel might not be 
responsible enough or desire foreign relationships.  Additionally, some foreign contacts 
may be at risk in their own countries by having relationships with U.S. personnel and 
may not be suitable for visits.  Before a FTV is approved, the DoD should ensure that the 
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recipients are worthy of sponsorship under FFRM.  The process of vetting contacts and 
personnel is essential to assuring that funding for FFRM is properly allocated and U.S. 
security interests are upheld.  The negative consequences of the vetting process are that 
errors will inevitable occur.  Contacts deemed inappropriate may actually prove 
beneficial at a later date.  Also, the suitability of some personnel for FFRM might be 
initially misjudged.  Therefore, a level of flexibility should be incorporated into the 
vetting process to allow continuous review of both contacts and personnel.  
Understanding that the process of establishing and maintaining relationships is an inexact 
science, the governing body tasked with managing FFRM should recognize the same 
principle when deciding the viability of contacts and DoD personnel alike.    
Besides strengthening relationships, FFRM increases cultural awareness.  Foreign 
travel and time spent with foreign contacts is an effective method of gaining cultural 
awareness.  FTVs can provide immeasurable experience to DoD personnel.  Considering 
the extent of knowledge that foreign allies learn in the U.S. through funded travel, FTVs 
can provide similar benefits to DoD personnel by further cementing existing relationships 
and increasing understanding of foreign cultures.  Since foreign relationships can benefit 
the DoD, funding periodic travel for the purposes of maintaining contacts should be 
supported by the DoD and enacted under FFRM.      
C. MULTINATIONAL MISSIONS AND EXERCISES 
Participation in multinational missions and exercises provides a unique 
opportunity to network with foreign counterparts and create lasting friendships that 
benefit DoD personnel and U.S. policy objectives.  While DoD military and non-military 
personnel routinely participate with allied nations in a variety of multinational exercises, 
there is seldom an emphasis to maintain relationships beyond the training. Once the 
exercise or mission ends, the relationship also ends.  A greater emphasis must be made on 
establishing and maintaining foreign contacts.    
United Nations Peacekeeping and Observer missions are particularly beneficial in 
establishing foreign contacts and provide a wide range of nations from which to network 
with.  Unfortunately, UN Peacekeeping and Observer missions are not currently counted 
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as joint assignments and are therefore not considered desirable by most officers.  These 
missions should, however, be given joint credit since the participants in these missions 
work with joint and multinational military personnel. Giving joint credit for UN tours 
will encourage DoD personnel to participate in these missions and allow additional 
opportunities to acquire foreign contacts (Ms. Jean Lute-Hull, United Nations Deputy 
Director of Peacekeeping Operations, interview, March 2006).  Participation in UN 
missions helps establish foreign relationships while having U.S. military personnel 
serving on the UN planning staff provides added situational awareness and influence.  
Additionally, increased involvement in UN operations by DoD personnel will help 
improve the United State’s relationship with the UN and further U.S. policy objectives.   
D. FOREIGN EDUCATION AND CULTURAL IMMERSION 
Foreign education and cultural immersion programs are other vehicles that foster 
the establishment of foreign relationships.  Expansion of programs that educate and 
immerse DoD personnel in foreign cultures provides significant increases in operational 
awareness and cultural intelligence.  Immersion in foreign cultures and exposure to the 
population allows personnel unprecedented access and knowledge regarding foreign 
societies.   
Foreign exchange and immersion programs bring similar experiences to U.S. 
personnel as those benefiting foreign counterparts in allied countries.  The DoD should, 
as a result, extensively increase exchange and immersion opportunities for personnel at 
the earlier portions of their career.  For instance, the DoD’s military service academies 
provide a limited number of cadets the privilege of studying abroad for a semester.  
Foreign study programs should incorporate a larger portion of service academy personnel 
and should also be offered to ROTC cadets at the university level.  Exposure of cadets to 
foreign exchange and immersion programs allows junior personnel to start networking 
and establish foreign contacts much earlier in their careers.   
Cultural immersion opportunities for mid-level personnel should also be 
expanded, such as the Olmstead program, which offers scholarships for O-3 level officers 
to study at foreign universities and earn Master’s level degrees.  Increasing Olmstead 
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type programs to educate and immerse a larger portion of mid-level officers will further 
bestow more chances to establish and maintain foreign relationships while increasing 
operational awareness and cultural intelligence.   
The downside of expanding foreign education and immersion programs is the 
strain on troop manning levels and assignment requirements.  Additionally, millions of 
dollars must be spent to send personnel to education and immersion training, but money 
spend on these programs will be inexpensive relative to other programs and exceedingly 
more effective than doing nothing.  While there is a slight downside to increasing the 
range of these programs, the benefits will outstrip the costs as servicemen and women 
will have the opportunity to establish foreign relationships much earlier in their careers 
and be afforded additional chances to maintain contacts.               
E. REUNIONS AND CONFERENCES 
Foreign military officers attend numerous DoD schools and courses each year 
providing the opportunities for U.S. military personnel to establish relationships.  
However, these relationships are often difficult to maintain after training when the 
participants are from different countries and potentially separated by thousands of miles.  
Reunions and conferences provide a venue for sustaining associations with foreign 
counterparts and can also help establish new contacts.   
Reunions for DoD schools and courses are an efficient means of bringing large 
groups of personnel and foreign contacts together to maintain relationships.  At a reunion 
personnel can meet with several contacts simultaneously versus the FTV which focuses 
more individual contacts.  The DoD should collectively incorporate reunions into schools 
and courses that are heavy with international military students.  Funding should be 
devoted to bring foreign officers to reunions whenever possible.  While funds should be 
allocated to pay travel expenses, DoD personnel traveling to reunions should at least be 
placed in a Permissive TDY status and not charged leave days for attending reunions 
whenever funding is unavailable.   
Conferences are an effective method of bringing personnel and foreign military 
members together to both establish and maintain relationships.  While conferences can 
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sometimes turn into reunions when the right attendees are invited, they remain more 
flexible than reunions.  Conferences can be held in the U.S. or various locations 
throughout the world when sponsored, for instance, by Geographic Combatant 
Commands (GCCs) or other DoD organizations.  Conferences can also be tailored to 
address regional issues for a more focused audience of foreign contacts.     
Reunions and conferences are an additional means of developing foreign contacts.  
Both types of meetings provide a centralized forum for establishing and maintaining 
multiple foreign relationships.  While reunions and conferences may not be as 
personalized as individual FTVs, they are an efficient method of gathering personnel and 
foreign contacts in one place to establish and maintain relationships.   
F. AFTERTHOUGHTS 
The DoD has several options available to leverage foreign relationships.  Rather 
than focusing on one method, the DoD should incorporate multiple approaches to set the 
conditions that establish and sustain foreign relationships.  FFRM, multinational missions 
and exercises, foreign education and immersion programs, and reunions and conferences 
are a balanced strategy that together will maximize the advantages of fostering foreign 
relationships.  Personnel should start networking early in their careers to fully capitalize 
on respective contacts.  Supporting exchange and immersion programs for cadets is the 
starting point for establishing relationships while the multitude of DoD schools, courses, 
conferences, reunions, and Foreign Travel Visits help further establish and maintain 
foreign relationships throughout the careers of DoD personnel.  Fostering foreign 
relationships should be considered a continuous process and the DoD should assist by 
shepherding the collection and sustainment of foreign contacts with programs like the 
Foreign Contact Database.  Additionally, the institutional culture of the DoD concerning 
foreign relationships should support and encourage personnel to actively seek 
opportunities to develop contacts.  Evaluations of DoD personnel should take into 
consideration, recognize, and reward military servicemen and women who are adept at 
establishing and maintaining relationships.  Professional pay, increased access to FFRM 
and immersion programs should be considered rewards for personnel who have proven 
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capable of developing foreign relationships.  Institutionalizing the process of fostering 
foreign relationships will provide unprecedented operational awareness and further U.S. 
security interests worldwide. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
…if the government and various intelligence agencies work with their 
counterparts in other nations, even if at one time they regarded them 
suspiciously (as was the case with Sudan), the payoff can be much greater 
for everyone involved, and much worse for the terrorists that threaten 
every free country.40 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
The primary objective of this thesis is to identify a means of increasing 
operational awareness overseas for the DoD.  With this in mind, the thesis examines the 
degree to which foreign relationships contribute to operational awareness and cultural 
intelligence.  This project puts forth the hypothesis that fostering the development and 
preservation of foreign relationships by U.S. military personnel will significantly benefit 
the DoD and support U.S. policy by increasing operational awareness throughout the 
world.  The project investigates shifting the institutional culture in the DoD concerning 
relationships between U.S. military personnel and foreign counterparts by developing a 
strategy that supports the establishment and maintenance of foreign contacts.  
Additionally, the thesis highlights the associated benefits of fostering foreign 
relationships.  Historical examples of individuals with key foreign relationships and 
networking skills are presented to demonstrate the intrinsic value foreign contacts bring 
to military operations and U.S. policy objectives.  Through developing an argument that 
favors fostering foreign relationships, this thesis seeks to provide a framework for 
expanding operational awareness and cultural intelligence within the DoD in support of 
U.S. policy objectives.   
B. LIMITATIONS 
While this thesis discusses numerous advantages to fostering foreign 
relationships, there are significant limitations that must be highlighted when considering 
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programs designed to support the creation and sustainment of foreign relationships.  
Firstly, the concept of establishing foreign relationships cannot be forced upon DoD 
personnel.  Some personnel will never be convinced of the utility of maintaining foreign 
contacts despite the incentives of funded travel and better evaluations.  Additionally, 
some personnel will not perceive the benefits foreign contacts deliver to the DoD’s 
operational awareness and cultural intelligence.  A key limitation that should also be 
addressed is that foreign relationships can take significant time to develop and might not 
provide tangible benefits until years later.  Another limitation is that not all personnel are 
well-suited for having foreign relationships.  Some personalities are xenophobic in nature 
or dislike networking as part of their duty description.  Additionally, instituting a culture 
that fosters foreign relationships does not guarantee that personnel will establish 
significant contacts.  Some personnel may never develop useful contacts while others 
might cultivate meaningful relationships of strategic importance to the DoD.  
Determining whether a contact is important or predicting if one will become significant at 
a future date is problematic.  Also, pinpointing which personnel are best suited to 
establish and maintain foreign contacts is difficult to accurately predict.  Therefore, 
money and time spent fostering foreign relationships may not always generate consistent 
results based on the human element involved in these associations.  In some cases, certain 
foreign contacts may have a negative opinion of efforts by the DoD to foster foreign 
relationships.  To some contacts, the programs might be interpreted as attempts to take 
advantage of foreign counterparts by gathering intelligence and influencing them to act in 
the best interests of the U.S.  Measuring the value of foreign relationships can also be 
considered another limitation to the thesis.  The notion that personal relationships can 
move mountains, as expressed in previous chapters, is difficult to quantify.  However, 
historical examples such as those presented in Chapter III, validate the benefits of 
creating programs that help initiate and sustain foreign relationships.          
C. MAXIMIZING RECOMMENDATIONS: A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS 
In order to fully capitalize on foreign relationships, the DoD should aggressively 
implement the programs outlined in Chapter IV.  Each recommended program is 
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mutually supportive of one another and should be enacted with equal enthusiasm.  
Without the Foreign Contact Database, the DoD has minimal situational awareness of 
foreign relationships and without Funded Foreign Relationship Maintenance, personnel 
are not as capable of sustaining foreign contacts and updating the FCD.  Multinational 
missions and exercises, foreign education and cultural immersion, and reunions and 
conferences all assist DoD personnel in gaining and maintaining foreign contacts to add 
to the FCD and visit at a later date to further develop the relationship using FFRM.  One 
program should not be championed at the expense of another.  Each foreign relationship 
related program should be vigorously funded to ensure success.  Strategically, the DoD 
should focus its efforts long term when measuring success and considering the 
effectiveness of programs that promote foreign relationships.  The DoD needs to accept 
that millions of dollars will be spent promoting foreign relationships and positive results 
may take years to fully realize.  Additionally, the institutional culture within the DoD 
must be shifted to one that supports the process of fostering foreign relationships.  
Ultimately, the price of fostering foreign relationships will prove worthwhile as the DoD 
gains additional influence through added operational awareness and cultural intelligence 
provided by foreign contacts.  By wholeheartedly embracing programs that promote the 
establishment and maintenance of foreign relationships, the DoD will further U.S. 
security interests and foreign policy objectives.            
D. FINAL CONCLUSION 
While the United States is a premier global power, it retains a deficiency in 
operational awareness and cultural intelligence.  The Department of Defense, however, 
remains in a unique position to leverage foreign relationships among personnel for the 
purposes of gaining influence, awareness, and furthering U.S. security and foreign policy 
objectives.  Foreign relationships provide numerous advantages, but are presently 
underfunded and underappreciated within the DoD.  A shift in the institutional culture of 
the DoD towards favoring the fostering of foreign relationships will allow an increased 
level of awareness and international influence to the United States government.  While 
the aforementioned programs designed to foster foreign relationships will cost millions, 
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the money spent will be insignificant compared to the billions allocated for military 
hardware, which has no ability to leverage foreign contacts and provide cultural 
intelligence.  Considering the historical vignettes presented earlier in the thesis, the costs 
associated with fostering foreign relationships have a relatively low financial and 
institutional investment and considerably high strategic payoff.  From averting coups and 
rescuing U.S. hostages to preventing major conflicts between nuclear powers, fostering 
foreign relationships among DoD personnel remains a worthy endeavor.  The DoD needs 
to start promoting the establishment of foreign associations earlier in the career’s of its 
personnel to allow maximum exposure and facilitate further development of 
relationships.  Finally, creating an atmosphere within the DoD that promotes an improved 
understanding and collaboration with foreign allies will be decisive in countering current 
shortcomings in operational awareness and cultural intelligence. As the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review advocated the continued development of the nation’s “enduring 
alliances,” the DoD must also focus on expanding alliances at the individual level 
through fostering foreign relationships.41   
                                                 
41 Quadrennial Defense Review (February 6, 2006): 6. “Achieving the vision set out in this report will 
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